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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-17110 
STATE OF NEW YORK (SUNY HEALTH SCIENCE 
CENTER OF SYRACUSE), 
Respondent. 
FREDERICK c. WOOLEY, for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (MAUREEN SEIDEL 
of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by United 
University Professions (UUP) to a decision by an Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ) on UUP's charge which alleges that the State of 
New York (SUNY Health Science Center of Syracuse) (HSCS or State) 
violated §209-a.l(d) and (e) of the Public Employees7 Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it raised the parking rate charged UUP 
unit employees who work at HSCS from $17.50 to $25 per month, 
plus tax, and refused to negotiate the issue of parking fees in 
good faith. 
At the hearing on September 22, 1996, the ALJ was informed 
that UUP had filed a contractual grievance alleging that the 
State's increase in parking rates altered the status quo in 
violation of Article 38 of the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement, which expired on June 30, 1995. Relying upon our 
decisions in State of New York (Department of Environmental 
Board - U-17110 -2 
Conservation)^ and Herkimer County BOCES.^7 the AKT deferred the 
charge to the parties7 contractual grievance procedure, which 
ends in binding arbitration. Referring to a "stated concern over 
the exercise of PERB's jurisdiction where there may be none," the 
AKT conditionally dismissed the charge "subject to a motion to 
reopen in the event that HSCS interposes objections to 
arbitrability of the grievance or should the award not satisfy 
the criteria set forth in New York City Transit Authority 
(Bordanskv) . "s/ 
UUP argues that the AKT erred in deferring its charge. In 
response, the State argues that certain of UUP's arguments cannot 
be considered because they are based on documents and facts not 
on the record, but that the ALJ's decision is, in any event, 
correct and should be affirmed. 
Having considered the parties' arguments, we affirm in part, 
reverse in part and remand the allegation concerning bad faith 
negotiations to the ALJ for such action as is necessary and 
appropriate. 
The AKT appears to have deferred this charge pursuant to our 
jurisdictional deferral policy as established in Herkimer County 
BOCES, supra. If so, that was incorrect because no aspect of 
this charge raises any jurisdictional issue. 
^29 PERB f3057 (1996). 
^20 PERB f3050 (1987). 
^4 PERB f3031 (1971). 
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Section 205.5(d) of the Act withdraws from our jurisdiction 
allegations of contract violation "that would not otherwise 
constitute an improper employer or employee organization 
practice." The claimed violation or discontinuation of a term of 
an expired agreement presents no jurisdictional issues. To 
trigger the jurisdictional limitation in §205.5(d) of the Act, 
and our corresponding jurisdictional deferral policy, the 
agreement in issue must arguably be in effect for purposes of the 
Act. An agreement is not in effect for purposes of the Act when 
it is expired by its terms. Each aspect of UUP's charge must be 
considered within this analytical framework. 
Allegations of violation of §209-a.l(e) of the Act are never 
subject to jurisdictional deferral because a cause of action 
under §209-a.l(e) of the Act is necessarily based upon terms in 
an agreement which is expired for purposes of the Act.-7 
There are two bases for the allegation that the State 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act. The first is the alleged 
unilateral change in parking rates. Parking rates are addressed 
in both Article 38 of the parties7 collective bargaining 
agreement and a 1989 memorandum of understanding (MOU). The 
ALJ's decision makes no mention of the 1989 MOU. The ALJ's order 
of deferral rests strictly on UUP's grievance, which claims a 
violation of Article 38 of the parties' expired collective 
bargaining agreement. If we do not consider the MOU, the ALJ's 
^State of New York, 27 PERB |J[3001 (1994) . 
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jurisdictional deferral of the unilateral change aspect of the 
§2 09-a.l(d) allegation is in error because the collective 
bargaining agreement had clearly expired for purposes of the Act 
when the parking rate was changed. The MOU is, however, part of 
the record and it must be considered in assessing a 
jurisdictional deferral. Like the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement, we find that the MOU is also expired for purposes of 
the Act. 
The 1989 MOU fixes a parking rate of $25 per month for UUP 
unit employees subject to the condition that "in no event shall 
members of the UUP/PSNY bargaining unit pay at a rate greater 
than any other unit of the HSCS". The MOU by its terms is 
effective March 1, 1989, and for five years thereafter, and 
"furthermore, shall be automatically renewed for consecutive 
periods of one year, except and unless either party . . . shall 
notify the other no less than thirty days prior to its expiration 
of its desire to negotiate a new agreement." 
The change in parking rates was made in July 1995, more than 
five years after the March 1, 1989 effective date of the MOU. 
The automatic renewal provisions of the MOU, which might 
otherwise have kept it in effect for purposes of the Act, have no 
application because the State at least twice on this record 
timely notified UUP of its need and desire to renegotiate the 
parking rates. As that notice to renegotiate prevented the MOU 
from automatically renewing pursuant to its own terms, the MOU is 
expired for purposes of the Act. Therefore, even if the MOU is 
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the source of UUP's right to a parking rate of $17.50,-/ the 
expired MOU, like the expired collective bargaining agreement, 
does not present any jurisdictional issues which would be subject 
to a jurisdictional deferral under Herkimer County BOCES. 
The second aspect of the §209-a.l(d) violation rests on the 
State's alleged bad faith during the parties7 negotiations on 
parking rates. That is an issue which is not contractual in 
nature-7 and it is not the subject of UUP's grievance. Even if 
the collective bargaining agreement and the MOU were in effect, 
the bad faith negotiations aspect of the charge would not be 
subject to a jurisdictional deferral because no jurisdictional 
issue is presented by that allegation. 
Therefore, neither of the two aspects of the §209-a.l(d) 
allegation nor the §209-a.l(e) allegation was properly deferred 
jurisdictionally under either State of New York (Department of 
Environmental Conservation). supra, or Herkimer County BOCES, 
supra. 
-
7UUP argues that it is the MOU which affords its unit employees 
the right to a parking rate of $17.50 because that was the rate 
paid by the employees in a different unit at HSCS. Further, UUP 
argues that the MOU locks in for its unit employees the lowest of 
the parking rates, which were fixed pursuant to arbitration 
proceedings which were pending at the time the 1989 MOU was 
reached, notwithstanding subsequent increases in rates for other 
employees at HSCS. 
-'The preservation by contract of a right to negotiate a contract 
term gives rise to a statutory duty to negotiate in good faith 
regarding that term. Village of Endicott. 23 PERB f3053 (1990). 
Any interpretation of contract made in such circumstance is 
merely incidental to the disposition of the statutory cause of 
action. 
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Entirely apart from our jurisdictional deferral policy, we 
have had a policy of much longer duration under which 
consideration of the merits of certain charges within our 
jurisdiction is deferred when a contractual grievance has been 
filed under a grievance procedure ending in binding arbitration. 
We hold that the unilateral change aspect of the §209-a.l(d) 
allegation and the §209-a.l(e) allegation were properly deferred 
on their merits to the pending contractual grievance. The 
§209-a.i(d) allegations centering on bargaining misconduct, 
however, are not deferrable. 
In deferring two of the three allegations presented in this 
charge, we recognize that we have applied our merits deferral 
policy to charges alleging multiple violations of the Act in 
different ways depending upon the circumstances presented in the 
particular case. In Connetquot Central School District^ 
(hereafter Connetquot), the Board specifically refused to defer 
consideration of an alleged violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Act, 
which would have been deferred had it been the only allegation of 
impropriety, because the charge also alleged a violation of 
§209-a.l(a) of the Act, which is not subject to deferral under 
our existing policy. In Monticello Central School District^ 
(hereafter Monticello^ and City of Saratoga Springs^7 (hereafter 
^19 PERB f3045 (1986). 
^22 PERB f3002 (1989). 
^18 PERB 13009 (1985). 
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Saratoga), the Board deferred consideration of §209-a.l(d) 
allegations to the parties' contractual grievance arbitration 
procedures even though the charges in those cases raised other 
allegations which were not subject to deferral and which were 
addressed on their merits. We believe that Monticello and 
Saratoga Springs represent the better policy choice for 
application in this case. 
Our merits deferral policy is grounded upon the belief that 
the policies of the Act favoring an accommodation of the parties' 
contractual dispute resolution procedures are generally advanced 
by deferral of the merits of certain charges when an 
interpretation of an expired agreement, which is a reasonably 
arguable source of right to the charging party, is necessary to 
the disposition of the merits and an award rendered under a 
binding grievance arbitration procedure is potentially 
dispositive of the charge. That policy should not be defeated 
simply because multiple allegations of impropriety happen to be 
presented in a single charge, and certainly not where the 
deferrable and nondeferrable allegations are legally and 
factually independent of one another. 
Had the unilateral change aspect of the §209-a.l(d) 
allegation been raised on its own, it would have been deferred to 
the pending grievance under our existing policy. The §209-a.l(e) 
allegation rests on exactly the same facts. Although this is the 
first time we have had occasion to consider the merits deferral 
of a §209-a.l(e) allegation, we believe that deferral of that 
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allegation in the circumstances of this case is consistent with 
the policies of the Act for the same reasons as the §209-a.l(d) 
unilateral change allegation is deferred. 
The §209-a.l(e) allegation in this case involves only a 
disagreement between the parties as to whether the language in 
their expired agreements allows UUP unit employees to park at a 
rate of $17.50 or permits the State to charge a rate of $25.00 
plus tax. Resolution of that contract interpretation issue can 
be had pursuant to the pending grievance, and if not, the charge 
is subject to reopening upon motion by UUP. 
In electing to defer the §209-a.l(e) allegation in this 
charge, we caution that we are not deciding that a merits 
deferral of all §209-a.l(e) allegations is appropriate regardless 
of circumstance. We express no opinion here, for example, as to 
whether deferral would be appropriate if the §209-a.l(e) 
allegation were of a different type,—7 or of the same type as 
here, but presented in circumstances in which the grievance 
procedure had not been invoked by the charging party. 
Similarly, we do not hold that a bifurcated merits deferral 
policy applied allegation by allegation is always appropriate. 
The bad faith negotiations aspect of the §209-a.l(d) charge is 
not deferrable because the disposition of that aspect of the 
charge does not rest on an interpretation of either the expired 
l^For example, one involving a repudiation of a term in an 
expired contract the meaning of which is not in dispute or a 
discontinuation defended on the ground that the obligations under 
the expired contract have sunsetted. 
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collective bargaining agreement or the MOU and an arbitrator's 
award will not be dispositive of it. So divorced is the bad 
faith bargaining allegation in this case from the unilateral 
change/contract discontinuation allegations that it is unlikely 
that an arbitration award would even address the former issue. 
We, accordingly, need not decide here whether a deferral of 
unilateral change/contract discontinuation allegations, which 
have been included in a charge together with nondeferrable 
allegations of statutory impropriety, would be appropriate if 
litigation of the nondeferred allegations necessitated proof of 
facts relevant to a disposition of the allegations otherwise 
susceptible to deferral. There may well be circumstances in 
which the "all or nothing" deferral policy applied in Connetquot 
may be the most appropriate policy choice. In this case, 
however, the deferred §209-a.l(d) and (e) allegations are wholly 
independent of the bad faith negotiations allegations. The 
State's alleged misconduct at the table can be fully litigated 
without any litigation concerning the meaning of the expired 
contract terms in issue both in the pending contract grievance 
and in the unilateral change/contract discontinuation allegations 
in the improper practice charge. In such circumstances, there is 
no persuasive reason not to defer the separate unilateral 
change/contract discontinuation allegations even though the bad 
faith bargaining allegations cannot be deferred. 
In summary, no aspect of the charge is properly deferred on 
a jurisdictional basis. The ALJ's decision to that extent is 
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reversed. Both the unilateral change aspect of the §209-a.l(d) 
allegation and the §209-a.l(e) allegation, however, were properly 
deferred on a merits basis to the pending contractual grievance. 
The ALJ's conditional dismissal of those allegations pursuant to 
application of a merits deferral policy is, therefore, affirmed. 
The ALJ's decision deferring that part of the §209-a.l(d) 
allegation involving misconduct and bad faith during the parties' 
negotiations on parking fees is reversed and that aspect of the 
charge alone is remanded to the ALJ for further processing 
consistent with this decision. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: March 26, 1997 
Albany, New York 
^4— f lw( A. 
Pauline" R. Klnsella, 'Chairperson 
Eric J. Schmertz, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC. 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-17011 
BUFFALO SEWER AUTHORITY, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MIGUEL ORTIZ of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
DAMON & MOREY (JAMES N. SCHMIT of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Buffalo 
Sewer Authority (Authority) to a decision by an Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ) on a charge brought by the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA). 
CSEA alleges that the Authority violated §209-a.l(d) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it issued 
memoranda changing unilaterally a practice regarding work 
assignments to CSEA unit members in the case of unanticipated 
absences of shift superintendents. Specifically, the charge, as 
amended, alleges that the Authority unilaterally assigned the 
assistant shift superintendent-7 or a wastewater operator II to 
-'The positions of assistant shift superintendent and shift 
superintendent are in the unit represented by CSEA. 
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fill vacancies when a shift superintendent was absent from a 
shift due to illness or disability. The wastewater operator II 
is in a unit represented by the Communications Workers of America 
(CWA). Prior to that change, shift superintendents covered 
unanticipated absences in their own ranks and received overtime 
when, as a result, they worked an additional shift. 
The ALT determined that the Authority had violated §209-
a.l(d) of the Act by unilaterally establishing a new staffing 
procedure for covering the unanticipated absences of the shift 
superintendents. The Authority excepts to the ALT's decision, 
arguing that the ALT erred both in her findings of fact and her 
legal conclusions. CSEA supports the ALT's decision. 
After a review of the record and consideration of the 
parties' arguments, we affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the 
decision of the ALT. 
The Authority operates its treatment plant on a twenty-four 
hour, seven day a week basis. The work day is divided into 
three, eight-hour shifts. Two shift superintendents are assigned 
to each shift. There is also a seventh shift superintendent who, 
as the relief shift superintendent, is assigned to work Monday 
through Friday on the 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. shift.27 The shift 
superintendents supervise the assistant shift superintendent and 
employees in titles represented by CWA. From 1991 to 1995, if a 
shift superintendent was absent from his or her shift, the relief 
-'The relief shift superintendent replaces any of the six 
regularly scheduled shift superintendents who are out on vacation 
or extended illness or disability. 
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shift superintendent was assigned to work that shift. If a 
vacancy remained unfilled, a shift superintendent from the prior 
shift would stay to fill that shift vacancy, receiving overtime 
pay for working the additional shift. If neither of the shift 
superintendents from the prior shift could work, the other shift 
superintendents were polled to find one of them to work the 
vacant shift at the overtime rate. Only after these options had 
been exhausted would the assistant plant superintendent be 
contacted.^7 The assistant plant superintendent would then 
assign a wastewater operator II to fill the shift superintendent 
vacancy. -7 
Between July 11, 1995, and December 15, 1995, Sal LoTempio, 
the assistant plant superintendent, issued several memoranda, 
assigning the assistant shift superintendent-7 and different 
wastewater operator lis to cover various, isolated, shift 
superintendent absences.-7 However, LoTempio's final 
^From 1987 to 1991, the Authority employed three assistant shift 
superintendents who were used to fill unanticipated shift 
superintendent vacancies when no shift superintendents were 
available. The assistant shift superintendent positions were 
apparently vacant from 1991 until May 1995, when the Authority 
filled one position. The assistant shift superintendent is 
regularly assigned to the 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. shift, where he 
primarily performs clerical work. When he is called upon to fill 
in for an absent shift superintendent, he is paid at the shift 
superintendent's regular rate of pay, not premium pay. 
'^The wastewater operator II was formerly classified as a sludge 
disposal operator. 
-
7The assistant shift superintendent, as part of his job 
description, acts as shift superintendent in his absence. 
-
7The July 12 and 13, 1995 memoranda assigned the assistant shift 
superintendent to fill a shift superintendent vacancy. 
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memorandum, dated December 15, 1995, established a general 
procedure, utilizing only wastewater operator lis, for filling 
unanticipated vacancies of shift superintendents.-7 
We conclude that from 1991 to 1995 the Authority established 
a practice for covering unanticipated shift superintendent 
absences which provided for the use first of the relief shift 
superintendent, then shift superintendents, and then, on the rare 
occasions when it became necessary, the use of a wastewater 
operator II. This continuous practice of over four years was of 
sufficient duration to establish it as the practice used in 
securing coverage for unanticipated shift superintendent 
absences.-7 That this was the Authority's practice, however, 
does not mean that changes in the practice necessarily violate 
the Act. 
Analytically, the charge presents two different alleged 
violations of §209-a.l(d). One deals with the July 12 and 13, 
1995 assignment of the assistant shift superintendent to fill 
unanticipated absences of a shift superintendent. The second 
involves the assignment of wastewater operator lis to cover 
similar absences as directed by LoTempio's July 11 and 13, 
November 15, and December 15, 1995 memoranda. 
-
7When called upon to fill a shift superintendent vacancy, a 
wastewater operator II is paid the higher rate of an acting 
assistant superintendent, but a rate lower than that paid to a 
shift superintendent. 
g7Countv of Nassau. 24 PERB 13027 (1991); Citv of Rochester. 21 
PERB 13045 (1988), conf'd, 155 A.D.2d 1003, 22 PERB 17035 (4th 
Dep't 1989). 
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We reverse the ALT as to the Authority's use of an assistant 
shift superintendent to fill a temporary shift superintendent 
vacancy. It is within the Authority's management prerogative to 
assign and deploy its personnel who are on duty to tasks 
consistent with their positions.-7 The assistant shift 
superintendent was not called in to work. He was already at work 
and was merely assigned job duties consistent with his job 
description and his unit placement. Although this resulted in 
the shift superintendents losing an opportunity to work 
additional hours for additional pay, the shift superintendents do 
not have a statutory right to work overtime. The opportunity to 
work overtime is conditioned at least upon the availability of 
overtime work. We view the situation here no differently than if 
an employer hired additional employees and thereby reduced or 
eliminated any need for any overtime assignments. Just as the 
existing unit employees7 loss of overtime opportunity in such 
circumstances would not make the employer's decision to hire 
additional staff mandatorily negotiable, neither does the shift 
superintendents' loss of overtime opportunity make the 
Authority's deployment of the assistant shift superintendent 
while on duty mandatorily negotiable. Similarly, a decision by 
the Authority to leave a temporary vacancy unfilled would result 
in a loss of overtime, but that would not make the decision 
mandatorily negotiable. The deployment of the assistant shift 
City of Newburcrh. 10 PERB f3001 (1977) . 
Board - U-17011 -6 
superintendent without negotiations, accordingly, does not 
violate §209-a.l(d) of the Act. 
The Authority's assignment of wastewater operator lis to 
fill unanticipated shift superintendent absences is, however, 
violative of §209-a.l(d) of the Act. The wastewater operator lis 
are not CSEA bargaining unit personnel. For several years, the 
Authority has utilized the wastewater operator lis only on the 
rare occasion when the relief superintendent and none of the 
shift superintendents were available to fill such vacancies. 
These few instances are not sufficient to breach CSEA's 
exclusivity over the performance of the shift superintendents' 
work, especially when they occurred when all other unit personnel 
had been polled and found unable or unwilling to cover the 
unanticipated absence.—7 The assignment of wastewater operator 
lis to fill vacancies arising in positions in another unit 
constituted an improper unilateral transfer of CSEA's exclusive 
unit work. 
Based on the foregoing, the decision of the ALT is affirmed, 
except as to assignment of the assistant shift superintendent to 
fill shift superintendent vacancies as to which the ALJ's 
decision is reversed.—7 
^Citv Sch. Dist. of the Citv of Long Beach. 26 PERB J[3065 
(1993) . 
—'Finding that the Authority had unilaterally established a 
staffing procedure for the filling of unanticipated vacancies, 
the AKT ordered the Authority to cease and desist from failing to 
negotiate in good faith concerning the filling of vacancies and 
ordered the Authority to negotiate in good faith. That portion 
of the order is deleted pursuant to our decision in Middle 
Country Cent. Sch. Dist., 23 PERB ^3045 (1990). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Authority: 
1. Rescind the memoranda of July 11 and 13, 1995, 
November 15, 1995, and December 15, 1995, as they 
pertain to the assignment of wastewater operator U s to 
cover unanticipated absences of shift superintendents. 
2. Make shift superintendents whole for any loss of 
wages, including overtime pay, and benefits resulting 
from the Authority's use of waste water operator lis to 
cover unanticipated shift superintendent absences, with 
interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal 
rate. 
3. Sign and post the attached notice in all locations 
at which notices of information to CSEA unit employees 
are ordinarily posted. 
DATED: March 26, 1997 
Albany, New York 
14....-
Pauline R insella,' Chairperson 
Eric J7 Schmertz, Member 
< 
\ 
I 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES'FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Buffalo Sewer Authority (Authority) in the unit represented by Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO that the Authority will: 
1. Rescind the memoranda of July 11 and 13,1995, November 15,1995 and December 15,1995 as they 
pertain to the assignment of wastewater operator lis to cover unanticipated absences of shift 
superintendents. 
2. Make shift superintendents whole for any loss of wages, including overtime pay, and benefits 
resulting from the Authority's use of waste water operator lis to cover unanticipated shift 
superintendent absences, with interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
BUFFALO SEWER AUTHORITY 
Th^ .iotice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC. 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, ERIE COUNTY 
LOCAL 815, ERIE COUNTY WHITE 
COLLAR EMPLOYEES UNIT, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-15770 
COUNTY OF ERIE, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (TIMOTHY CONNICK of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
MICHAEL A. CONNORS, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by both the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Erie County Local 815, Erie County White Collar Employees Unit 
(CSEA) and the County of Erie (County) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (AKT) on CSEA's charge against the 
County. CSEA alleges that the County violated §209-a.l(d) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it reassigned 
supervisory duties performed exclusively by its unit employees to 
a nonunit employee, Melissa Marr, the coordinator of the Pretrial 
Services Program (Program). 
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After a hearing, the AKT held that the County had violated 
the Act by reassigning to Marr duties involving the day-to-day 
supervision of Program activities and ordered the work as defined 
restored to CSEA unit employees. 
CSEA excepts to the ALJ's failure to order make-whole 
relief. CSEA alleges that one unit employee, Susan Ostrowski, 
was laid off and another unit employee, Carol Lindner, was 
demoted because their daily supervisory duties, which occupied a 
large percentage of their workday, had been reassigned to Marr. 
CSEA requests that make-whole relief be ordered or that the case 
at least be remanded for further evidence regarding the nature 
and extent of any damages. 
The County argues in its exceptions that the ALT erred in 
finding a violation of the Act. The County maintains that CSEA 
did not have exclusivity over the duties transferred to the 
Program coordinator. The County argues in respect to exclusivity 
that the supervisory duties in issue have always belonged to the 
coordinator, who could choose whether or not and to what extent 
to delegate those duties to any unit employees. Moreover, the 
County argues that it did not, as the ALJ found, simply 
substitute one supervisor for others to carry on duties 
unchanged. Instead, the County argues that the assignment of 
daily supervision duties to Marr was a "dramatic change" which 
was needed to save the Program. 
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Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision holding the County in 
violation of the Act as alleged, but modify the remedial order. 
The ALT found that CSEA unit employees had been solely 
responsible in fact for the day-to-day supervision of the Program 
for years, a finding fully supported by the record. Although the 
duties of these unit employees could have been performed by the 
Program coordinator under the job description for that position, 
that fact is immaterial to the disposition of the case before us. 
It is the duties actually performed, not the duties which might 
have been or could have been performed, which are material in a 
transfer of unit work case.-7 As the A U found, the record 
shows that the Program coordinator exercised only some limited 
daily supervisory functions (scheduling, assignment, records 
review) for a brief period or from time to time in unusual 
circumstances, e.g., acute jail overcrowding. The ALJ correctly 
held that the Program coordinator's limited and temporary 
assumption of some daily supervisory duties did not breach an 
exclusivity otherwise established and maintained by CSEA unit 
employees for years. The occasional or incidental performance of 
unit work by nonunit personnel does not deprive unit employees of 
exclusivity.-7 
^Hewlett-Woodmere Union Free Sch. Dist. . 28 PERB f 3039 (1995) , 
conf d. A.D.2d , 29 PERB f7019 (2d Dep't 1996). 
^See, e.g., Union-Endicott Cent. Sch. Dist.. 29 PERB f3056 
(1996) (appeal pending) ; Village of Malverne, 28 PERB 13042 
(1995); County of Onondaga. 27 PERB 13048 (1994). 
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The ALT correctly distinguished this case from Hyde Park 
Central School District,-7 where there was neither exclusivity 
nor substantial similarity in the supervisory duties before and 
after the work in issue was transferred for performance by a 
nonunit supervisor. Similarly, City of Batavia,,-7 relied upon 
by the County, is inapposite. In that case, unit and nonunit 
employees had always and regularly actually done the same work. 
That shared performance of duties prevented any employees from 
having exclusivity over the work in issue. In this case, the 
coordinator did not actually do the work done by unit employees 
except on a sporadic basis or under unusual circumstances. 
The County's remaining defense to its unilateral transfer of 
unit work, which we find unpersuasive, is that the transfer of 
daily supervisory duties to the Program coordinator was needed to 
save a failing program. 
The record establishes that the minimum stated 
qualifications for the positions of confidential investigator 
formerly held by Lindner, senior confidential investigator, 
formerly held by Ostrowski, and Program coordinator are 
different. The County, however, did not allege in its answer a 
change in qualifications in defense of its transfer, it does not 
rely upon a change in position qualifications, and it did not 
take exception to the ALJ's determination that the balancing test 
^21 PERB 13011 (1988). 
^28 PERB f3076 (1995). 
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under Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority-7 was not 
triggered on the facts of this case. In such circumstances, the 
County's intended defense amounts to an argument that it had a 
compelling need to transfer the unit work to cure the "malaise" 
it believed affected the Program. Even assuming that the County 
transferred the work of CSEA's unit employees to the Program 
coordinator in the hope and belief that the coordinator would 
turn around what it thought was a failing program, a compelling 
need defense to unilateral action involving a mandatory subject 
of negotiation necessitates bargaining to the point of genuine 
deadlock prior to the unilateral action.-7 Here, the County did 
not bargain at all prior to its unilateral action. A compelling 
need defense, therefore, has no application. 
Having found a violation of the Act, we must consider CSEA's 
exceptions to the ALT's proposed remedy. Pursuant to those 
exceptions, we modify the ALJ's order to include make-whole 
relief. 
The ALJ did not order make-whole relief because there was no 
evidence on the record to establish that any unit employees lost 
any wages or benefits. We have not, however, required proof of 
damages as a condition to the entry of a make-whole order.-7 
5718 PERB 53083 (1985) . 
g'Wappingers Cent. Sen. Dist., 19 PERB J[3037 (1986), and 5 PERB 
f3074 (1972). 
^County of Clinton. 28 PERB ^3041 (1995); New Berlin Cent. Sch. 
Dist., 25 PERB 53060 (1992); County of Onondaga, 24 PERB f3014 
(1991). 
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Quite the contrary, we do not expect there to be litigation on 
remedy in the context of a hearing on the merits of a charge. 
Our policy is that any fact questions regarding remedy should 
await resolution in a post-hearing investigation during a 
compliance/enforcement review, which may include a hearing as 
necessary.-7 
CSEA alleges that Ostrowski would not have been laid off and 
that Lindner would not have been demoted if the County had not 
transferred their supervisory duties to Marr. The County denies 
those allegations. Make-whole relief is intended to fully remedy 
the violation of the Act found to have been committed and to 
place employees affected by the violation in the position they 
would have been in had the improper practice not been 
committed.-7 If CSEA's allegations are true, then a remedy 
lacking a make-whole order does not fully address the County's 
violation and partially insulates the County from its violation. 
Alternatively, because a make-whole order is effective only if 
and to the extent employees have been harmed as a result of the 
improper practice, a make-whole order will have no application if 
the unit employees have not been damaged in fact. If, as the 
County contends, Ostrowski would have been laid off and Lindner 
demoted regardless of the improper reassignment of their 
g/County of Broomer 22 PERB f3019 (1989); Uniondale Union Free 
Sch. Dist. . 21 PERB J[3044 (1988) . 
g/Burnt Hills-Ballston Lake Cent. Sch. Dist.. 25 PERB 13066 
(1992). 
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supervisory duties to Marr, then the make-whole aspect of the 
order will not apply.—7 In short, the absence of a make-whole 
order potentially denies CSEA a complete and proper remedy for 
the County's violation of the Act and its inclusion in a remedial 
order in no way adversely affects the County's legal rights. 
Whatever factual dispute there may be between CSEA and the County 
about whether or not any unit employees were in fact damaged by a 
loss of wages, benefits or other conditions of employment because 
of the transfer of daily supervisory duties to the Program 
coordinator can be resolved in the context of such subsequent 
proceedings as may be required in accordance with our established 
policy. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision and 
order as modified is affirmed. CSEA's exceptions are granted and 
the County's exceptions are denied. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the County: 
1. Immediately restore to CSEA's unit the duties of day-to-day 
supervision of the Pretrial Services Program. 
2. Make CSEA unit employees whole for the loss of wages, 
benefits or conditions of employment, if any, caused by the 
County's reassignment of the duties of day-to-day 
supervision of the Pretrial Services Program from CSEA unit 
employees to the Pretrial Services Program coordinator. 
^State of New York (Div. of Military and Naval Affairs). 24 PERB 
1[3024 (1991) . 
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3. Sign and post notice in the form attached in all locations 
ordinarily used to post notices of information to CSEA unit 
employees. 
DATED: March 26, 1997 
Albany, New York 
'Cxf^ fl 
insella, Chairperson 
Eric J/ Schmertz, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the County of Erie (County) in the unit represented by Civil Service Employees Association, 
Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Erie County Local 815, Erie County White Collar Employees Unit (CSEA) that the County 
will: 
1. Immediately restore to CSEA's unit the duties of day-to-day supervision of the Pretrial Services Program. 
2. Make CSEA unit employees whole for the loss of wages, benefits or conditions of employment, if any, caused by the 
County's reassignment of the duties of day-to-day supervision of the Pretrial Services Program from CSEA unit 
employees to the Pretrial Services Program coordinator. 
Dated By . 
(Representative) (Title) 
COUNTY OF ERIE 
7/..o- Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
^ STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CORRECTION OFFICERS' BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION OF ROCKLAND COUNTY, 
Charging Party, 
-and CASE -MO—U-17240 
COUNTY OF ROCKLAND and ROCKLAND 
COUNTY SHERIFF, 
Respondent. 
MICHAEL H. SUSSMAN, ESQ. (STEPHEN BER6STEIN Of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
PAUL V. NOWICKI, COUNTY ATTORNEY (JOSEPH E. SUAREZ of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Correction 
Officers' Benevolent Association of Rockland County (Association) 
to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALT) dismissing its 
charge against the County of Rockland (County) and the Rockland 
County Sheriff (Sheriff) (jointly, Employer). The Association 
alleges that the Employer violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by unilaterally ending a 
procedure under which correction officers' written requests for 
personal leave from their respective shifts were granted without 
regard to the number of officers on leave from the same shifts 
and by unilaterally imposing, for the first time, a quota on the 
number of officers permitted to take certain types of leave 
simultaneously. 
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The ALT found that there was a consistent practice prior to 
June 30, 1995, of granting without limitation unit members' 
advance written requests for personal leave.^ Sometime in 
June, Captain Anthony Farina issued a written directive to 
lieutenants that, pursuant to the parties7 new contract^7, they 
were not to approve personal leave requests if the number of 
officers to be on leave was already at the maximum for the shift 
in question. The lieutenants thereafter informed the sergeants 
of this directive. 
The Employer raised jurisdiction, timeliness and waiver as 
defenses to the charge and sought deferral of the charge to the 
contractual grievance procedure. The ALT found that PERB had 
jurisdiction over the charge and that it was timely filed, but 
dismissed the charge-7, finding that the Association had waived 
-
70ther types of leave were restricted so that on the day shift 
(8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.) five officers were permitted to take 
vacation simultaneously, on the 4:00 p.m. to midnight shift, four 
officers were allowed to be on vacation at the same time, and on 
the midnight to 8:00 a.m. shift, three officers could be on 
vacation. 
-'Negotiations for the parties' January 1, 1992 - December 31, 
1995 collective bargaining agreement were concluded in early 
1995. The agreement was signed on January 17, 1995, and made 
retroactive to January 1, 1992. 
^The ALT determined that deferral was not appropriate because 
the Employer had not specified whether it sought jurisdictional 
or merits deferral and there was no evidence that the Association 
had filed a grievance. The nature of the deferral sought need 
not be identified for PERB to defer, where appropriate, an 
improper practice charge, nor, as we recently noted in Town of 
Carmel, 29 PERB 53073 (1996) (issued after the issuance of the 
ALT's decision), need there be a pending grievance for either 
jurisdictional or merits deferral. However, the ALT was 
correct in declining to defer this charge because the explicit 
language of the contract is not a reasonably arguable source of 
right to the Association. 
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by agreement any further bargaining on the issue in the charge. 
The Association excepts to the ALJ's dismissal of the charge. 
The Employer has not responded to the exceptions. 
Upon our review of the record and our consideration of the 
parties' arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALT. 
Article XII of the 1992-95 collective bargaining agreement 
provides, in relevant part: 
c. Personal leave may be drawn only upon written 
request whenever possible and at a time convenient to 
and approved by the Sheriff; provided, however, that 
personal leave allowed for religious observance shall 
be granted on the days and hours required, insofar as 
the same may be granted without interference with the 
proper conduct of government functions. 
The ALJ found that this language gives the Sheriff the broad 
discretion to grant or deny any requests for personal leave based 
upon his convenience and the proper conduct of government 
functions. Clearly, the Sheriff has a right under Article XII 
(c) to grant or deny personal leave at his convenience or 
discretion and the Association has waived its right to complain 
about the exercise of that discretion.-' The parties' prior 
practice under which employees were allowed virtually unfettered 
use of personal leave has been superseded by the parties' clear 
agreement that the grant of personal leave is now subject to the 
Sheriff's discretion. As the directive in issue represented the 
exercise of a negotiated right, it was bilateral in nature and 
^State of New York - Unified Court System. 25 PERB J[3035 (1992) ; 
County of Nassau. 24 PERB 5[3027 (1991) . 
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did not violate the Employer's duty to bargain, which had 
previously been satisfied by agreement. 
Based on the foregoing, the Association's exceptions are 
denied and the decision of the ALJ is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: March 26, 1997 
Albany, New York 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AFSCME, LOCAL 650, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and-
CITY OF BUFFALO, 
Respondent. 
ROBERT J. REDEN, ESQ., for Charging Party 
EDWARD D. PEACE, CORPORATION COUNSEL (PATRICIA A. PANCOE 
and KEVIN J. KEANE of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions filed by AFSCME, Local 
650, AFL-CIO (AFSCME) to a decision by an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) on its charges against the City of Buffalo (City). 
The charge in U-17700 alleges that the City violated §209-a.l(a) 
and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by 
negotiating directly with a unit employee, Clare Yager, about her 
work schedule. In U-17785, AFSCME alleges that the City violated 
§209-a.l(a) and (d) of the Act when it terminated Yager's 
employment because AFSCME and the City failed to reach an 
agreement during their negotiations regarding Yager's work 
schedule. 
After a hearing, the ALJ dismissed both charges. The ALJ 
concluded that Yager's work schedule was not a mandatory subject 
of negotiation, that there had not been any direct dealing with 
CASE NOS. U-17700 & 
U-17785 
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Yager, and that the City had established Yager's work schedule at 
10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. 
AFSCME excepts to the ALJ's controlling finding of fact and 
her conclusions of law. AFSCME alleges that the City had not set 
Yager's hours at 10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., but at 9:30 a.m. to 
2:30 p.m. through negotiations directly with her. AFSCME argues 
further that Yager was improperly terminated because the City and 
AFSCME could not immediately agree in negotiations upon a work 
schedule for Yager which was acceptable to the City. 
The City argues in response that the ALJ's decision is 
factually and legally correct and should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision in U-17700 but reverse in 
U-17785. 
Yager began working as a part-time administrative program 
aide in the Youth Court in September 1995. Her duties in that 
position involved routine clerical and administrative functions. 
Her position was first included in AFSCME's unit in late October 
1995. 
With regard to Yager's work schedule as an administrative 
aide, the record shows that Yager's supervisor, Lamont Burley, 
himself newly hired, told her in September that he needed her to 
work 10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. Burley, however, "compromised" and 
agreed to Yager's request to work 9:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. because 
she had a second job with a different employer which prevented 
her from staying until 3:00 p.m. 
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In late November 1995, Yager asked Burley if she could work 
9:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. instead of 9:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. until 
her car was repaired because she needed some additional time to 
get to her second job by public transportation. Burley changed 
her schedule as requested on his assumption that the car repairs 
would be made within a short time. 
When Burley saw Yager parking her car at work on February 1, 
1996, which Yager had had repaired only the day before due to a 
lack of funds, he told her to resume her 9:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. 
schedule. Yager declined, apparently without consequence. 
At a meeting in February with Yager and Michael Norwood, the 
Executive Director of the Youth Court program, Burley instructed 
Yager to work 9:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. pending negotiations with 
AFSCME. That directive was confirmed by subsequent memorandum to 
Yager. Yager refused to initial the memorandum as the City had 
requested, telling a City representative that she wanted to 
contact AFSCME about what she should do before indicating her 
agreement to the memorandum. 
On April 1, AFSCME and the City's representatives met to 
discuss Yager's work schedule as well as her compensation and 
benefit package. The City stated that it needed Yager to work 
10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. AFSCME demanded a 9:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. 
schedule, which Yager had apparently continued to work despite 
the February directive to work 9:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m., again 
without consequence. After agreement was reached on salary and 
benefit terms for Yager's position, AFSCME tentatively agreed to 
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a 10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. schedule subject to consultation with 
Yager. Yager rejected the 10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. schedule. 
AFSCME informed the City that 10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. was 
unacceptable and it then offered the City a 9:30 a.m. starting 
time. Without notice to AFSCME or Yager, the City decided that a 
9:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. schedule was not acceptable to it. On 
April 2, it terminated Yager's employment, effective April 4, 
without any response or counter proposal to AFSCME about its 
proposal for a 9:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. work schedule. 
The direct dealing charge in U-17700 was properly dismissed 
by the ALJ. The discussions Burley had with Yager regarding her 
work schedule before her position was included in AFSCME's unit, 
and his discussions with Yager in November, which led to a 
temporary 9:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. schedule for her, are not 
alleged by AFSCME to have violated the Act. 
Direct dealing involves an employer's actual or attempted 
establishment of a negotiating relationship with one or more unit 
employees to the exclusion of the employees' exclusive bargaining 
agent.^ The February meeting between Yager and City agents, 
and the City's subsequent memorandum to Yager, did not involve 
any negotiations or dealings between Yager and the City. The 
City merely directed Yager to resume the 9:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. 
schedule under which she had been hired. Although that was a 
change from Yager's 9:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. schedule, AFSCME 
^County of Allegany, 27 PERB f3013 (1994); City of Schenectady, 
26 PERB 53047 (1993); Town of Huntington. 26 PERB J[3034 (1993). 
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concedes, and the record establishes, that that schedule was only 
a temporary accommodation to Yager's personal problems. 
Directives simply restoring Yager's original 9:30 a.m. to 
2:30 p.m. schedule do not constitute an improper direct dealing 
or bypass of AFSCME. 
The charge in U-17785 alleges that Yager's termination 
violated §209-a.l(a) and (d) because it was an action taken as a 
result of the City's and AFSCME's failure to reach an agreement 
regarding Yager's working hours. Two facts are relevant to the 
analysis of the legal issues presented by this charge. 
First, contrary to the ALJ's factual finding, the record 
establishes that Yager's hours had not been fixed at 10:00 a.m. 
to 3:00 p.m. Although those were the hours Burley and other City 
agents may have preferred, Burley nonetheless fixed Yager's hours 
at 9:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m., a fact he and other City agents 
reiterated both orally and in writing in February. The ALJ's 
finding that Yager's hours were fixed at 10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. 
is not supported by the record and it is, therefore, reversed. 
Second, the record also establishes that Yager would not 
have been terminated and her position would not have been 
abolished had AFSCME agreed to the 10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. work 
schedule the City wanted. Burley and Daniel Durwa, Commissioner 
of Human Services for Parks and Recreation, the person who 
decided to terminate Yager, specifically admitted this in their 
testimony during the hearing. 
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Against this factual background, the ALJ's decision 
dismissing the charge in U-17785 must be reversed, whether or not 
Yager's work schedule is considered a mandatory subject of 
negotiation. Even if we were to conclude that the City did not 
violate §209-a.l(d) of the Act because Yager's work schedule is a 
nonmandatory subject of negotiation, her termination nonetheless 
violated §209-a.l(a) of the Act. As the remedy issued on our 
conclusion that Yager's termination violated §209-a.l(a) of the 
Act duplicates any we would issue upon a finding of violation of 
§209-a.l(d), we do not reach the question as to whether the City 
also violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act. 
Section 209-a.l(a) of the Act broadly and generally 
prohibits employer actions which interfere with employees' 
statutory rights. Employees have the protected statutory right 
to have union representation with respect to any issue affecting 
their employment relationship, whether or not that issue embraces 
a mandatory subject of negotiation. That request for and receipt 
of union representation constitutes participation in a union, a 
right specifically protected by §202 of the Act. An employer may 
not have any legal duty to negotiate with a union if a subject 
matter proposed for discussion is nonmandatory, but the absence 
of a legal duty to bargain does not mean that the employer is 
allowed to take personnel actions against an employee because of 
the nature of the help extended to that employee by his or her 
union representative. 
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Yager was admittedly terminated because AFSCME's proposals 
on her behalf in negotiations regarding work schedule were 
"unacceptable" to the City. The City, admittedly "frustrated" by 
AFSCME's response to its demand for a 10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. 
schedule, simply fired Yager. The City never ordered Yager to 
work 10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. It never sought to discipline Yager 
for her apparent refusal to work 9:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. as 
directed in February. It never informed AFSCME that it 
considered their negotiations ended or at impasse and it never 
responded to AFSCME's proposal for a 9:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. 
schedule. In response to AFSCME's proposal, it wrote Yager to 
inform her that her "services . . . will no longer be required 
effective at the end of the work day on Thursday, April 4, 1996". 
To permit Yager's discharge would allow the City, or any 
other employer, to discharge any number of employees, or take any 
other adverse personnel action against them, as a response to a 
union's presentation for discussion or negotiation of one or more 
nonmandatory subjects of negotiation which that employer found to 
be "unacceptable" for any reason. The statutory right of 
employees to seek out and receive their union's help regarding 
any issue, mandatorily negotiable or otherwise, obviously becomes 
entirely meaningless if they risk losing their jobs or other 
employment conditions simply because their union has chosen to 
give them help in a way their employer considers to be 
unacceptable or frustrating. It was the nature of AFSCME's 
proposals, nothing else, which led to Yager's discharge. If 
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AFSCME had never opposed the City's demand for a 10:00 a.m. to 
3:00 p.m. schedule, or if it had agreed to that schedule quickly 
enough to avoid frustrating the City, Yager would, by the City's 
own admission, still be working. The City could not lawfully 
deem its proposal in negotiations to change Yager's existing 
schedule to be a directive to Yager to work 10:00 a.m. to 
3:00 p.m. Nor could the City then deem AFSCME's counterproposal 
for a continuation of Yager's 9:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. schedule to 
be Yager's refusal to comply with that deemed directive. If 
union proposals on a subject of negotiation, even if 
nonmandatory, raised in opposition to employer demands on that 
subject became grounds for lawful termination of employees, then 
employees would lose much of their statutorily protected right of 
representation. 
The interference violation becomes all the clearer given 
that the City's action was unnecessary on its operating 
assumption. If Yager's work schedule is a nonmandatory subject 
of negotiation, as the City believes it to be and the ALT held, 
then the City could have refused to bargain that subj ect with 
AFSCME at any time, it could have ordered Yager to work 10:00 
a.m. to 3:00 p.m., and it could have discharged her for 
noncompliance with that directive, or for her earlier refusal in 
February to resume a 9:30 a.m. to 2:30 p*m. schedule, subject to 
whatever other contractual or statutory rights Yager and AFSCME 
may have had. What the City could not do lawfully under the Act 
was what it did: terminate Yager because AFSCME pursued beyond 
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the City's self-declared and unannounced frustration point the 
possibility of a work schedule for her which the City considered 
unacceptable. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision in 
U-17700 is affirmed. IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge 
in U-17700 must be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
The ALJ's decision dismissing the charge in U-17785 is 
reversed. Having found in U-17785 that the City violated §209-
a.l(a) of the Act, IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the City: 
1. Re-create the position of Administrative Program Aide 
in the Youth Court and immediately reinstate Clare 
Yager to that position. 
2. Make Clare Yager whole for any wages and benefits lost 
as a result of her termination from the position of 
Administrative Program Aide in the Youth Court, with 
interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal 
rate. 
3. Sign and post notice in the form attached in all 
locations at which notices of information to AFSCME 
unit employees are ordinarily posted. 
DATED: March 26, 1997 
Albany, New York 
_^ _ 
-v^CA i 
PauLwfe R. K i n s e l l a 
J^ 
Chairoerson 
Eric/ J. Schmertz, Member 

NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES'FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the City of Buffalo (City) in the unit represented by AFSCME, Local 650, AFL-CIO that the 
City will: 
1. Re-create the position of Administrative Program Aide in the Youth Court and reinstate Clare Yager to that 
position immediately. 
2. Make Clare Yager whole for any wages and benefits lost as a result of her termination from the position of 
Administrative Program Aide in the Youth Court, with interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
CITY OF BUFFALO 
Thir Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by, J other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 2110, UNITED AUTO WORKERS, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and-
NEW YORK STATE HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, 
Respondent. 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY 
EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION - UAW LOCAL 2110, 
AFL-CIO, 
Charging Parties, 
-and- CASE NO. U-18480 
NEW YORK STATE HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY and 
its subsidiaries, including AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING CORPORATION, 
Respondents. 
SALLY OTOS, ESQ., for Charging Parties 
HITSMAN, HOFFMAN & O'REILLY (KELLY A. O'NEILL of counsel), 
for Respondents 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us now on an application by the New York 
State Housing Finance Agency (HFA) and its subsidiary, Affordable 
Housing Corporation (AHC), for permission to appeal a ruling by 
an Administrative Law Judge (AU) consolidating these two charges 
for hearing. 
CASE NO. U-17986 
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The charge in U-17986 was filed in the latter part of June 
1996 by Local 2110, United Auto Workers, AFL-CIO (UAW) against 
HFA. That charge alleges that HFA violated §209-a.l(d) of the 
Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act (Act) by consistently 
refusing to give UAW information relevant to grievance 
investigation and processing. UAW cites in its charge as 
examples of HFA's impropriety requests for information involving 
Joseph D7Lando and Alex Hopson. HFA answered that charge, 
alleging, inter alia, that the UAW is not the certified or 
recognized bargaining agent for any of its employees and that it 
was not and never was Hopson7s employer. HFA alleges that the 
New York State Housing Finance Agency Employees Association 
(HFAEA) is the bargaining agent for its employees and that Hopson 
was at all times employed by AHC, whose employees are also 
represented by HFAEA. One day of hearing on this charge was held 
on December 2, 1996. 
The charge in U-18480 was filed on December 9, 1996 by the 
HFAEA-UAW, Local 2110, AFL-CIO against the HFA "and its 
subsidiaries", including AHC. This charge alleges a violation of 
§209-a.l(a), (c) and (d) of the Act centering on Hopson7s 
termination from employment in October 1996, requests for 
information regarding that termination, and the respondents7 
responses thereto. 
Contemporaneously with the filing of U-18480, HFAEA-UAW 
moved to amend the charge in U-17986 to change the name of both 
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the charging party and the respondent, and also moved to 
consolidate the two charges. By letter dated January 31, 1997, 
the ALJ reserved decision on the motion, to amend, but he ruled 
that the charges should be consolidated for hearing. Hearings on 
the charges as consolidated are now scheduled for continuation in 
late April 1997. 
HFA and AHC argue that they are separate legal entities and 
separate employers as a matter of law. They further argue that 
HFAEA, regardless of its affiliation with UAW, is the exclusive 
bargaining agent for employees of HFA and AHC, not UAW. HFA and 
AHC argue that the two charges should be heard separately because 
they involve different charging parties and different 
respondents. They argue also that consolidation is otherwise 
inappropriate because the charges are dissimilar as to legal and 
factual issues and because AHC is prejudiced by the 
consolidation. 
HFAEA and UAW argue that the application for permission to 
appeal is untimely because it was filed outside the fifteen 
working days allowed for exceptions, that the conditions for the 
grant of permission for an interlocutory appeal have not been 
satisfied, but that if permission to appeal is granted, the 
appeal should be denied on its merits and the ALT's ruling 
consolidating the charges for hearing affirmed. 
An appeal from the ALJ's ruling consolidating the charges is 
considered at this time with our permission only pursuant to 
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§204.7(h)(2) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules). As a request for 
permission to appeal is not in the nature of an exception to an 
ALJ's dispositive decision and order, rather a motion submitted 
for our discretionary consideration, the time limits for filing 
exceptions in §204.10 of the Rules do not apply and the motion 
was not unreasonably or prejudicially delayed. 
A ruling consolidating charges for hearing is appropriate 
for interlocutory appeal because the ruling cannot be adequately 
reviewed at a later stage in the proceedings. If we were to 
reverse the ALJ's ruling, our decision would either be 
meaningless or it would require us to order new hearings on each 
charge separately. As we have concluded that neither alternative 
is acceptable, we have regularly granted permission for 
interlocutory appeals from rulings consolidating charges and we 
do so here.-7 
Turning to the merits of the application, HFA's and AHC's 
main reason for opposing the consolidation of these charges is 
their belief that consolidation will effectively amend U-17986 to 
cure any of the jurisdictional deficiencies that have been raised 
in defense to that charge. A consolidation of charges does not, 
however, serve to amend those charges in any respect. Both of 
these charges will proceed to disposition upon their own merits, 
with whatever legal or factual deficiencies may be present, 
-^Greenburqh No. 11 Union Free Sch. Dist., 28 PERB f3034 (1995); 
County of Nassau. 22 PERB f3027 (1989). 
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subject to the ALJ's ruling on any motion to amend. If, and to 
the extent, for example, the charge in U-17986 was brought by the 
wrong charging party or against the wrong respondent, those 
deficiencies are not removed or cured simply because that charge 
is being heard at the same time as the one in U-18480.^7 
Having concluded that HFA's and AHC's main basis for 
objecting to the consolidation is inapplicable, the guestion 
becomes whether the ALJ's ruling should be reversed for other 
reasons. In that regard, this type of ruling is committed to an 
ALJ's discretion, such that we will reverse only if the ruling 
results in substantial prejudice to a party and, thereby, 
constitutes an abuse of discretion.^7 HFA and AHC have 
identified some reasons disfavoring consolidation. However, 
there are also reasons favoring the consolidation of the charges 
for hearing such that the ALT's ruling is not reversible as an 
abuse of discretion.-7 
Major aspects of both charges involve actions taken or not 
taken by HFA and AHC with respect to Hopson. It appears, 
therefore, that facts bearing upon the disposition of the second 
-
7Certain of the parties7 arguments have relevance to the motion 
pending before the ALT to amend the charge in U-17986 but not to 
the ruling consolidating the charges. Nothing herein is intended 
as a comment upon or a determination of the merits of that motion 
or any arguments in opposition thereto or the merits of any issue 
raised under either charge. 
-
7Countv of Nassau, supra note 1. 
Greenburqh No. 11 Union Free Sch. Dist.. supra note 1. 
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charge will also likely be presented in any future litigation of 
the first charge. It serves no useful purpose to have the same 
facts litigated twice in separate hearings even if some of the 
legal issues in the two charges are different to an extent. The 
parties and the agency are equally well served by a consolidation 
which may save time and expense. 
The only reason for not consolidating these particular 
charges is that one day of hearing had been held on the first 
charge before the second charge was filed and consolidated with 
the first charge for continued hearings. If we were persuaded 
that a consolidation of the charges would prejudice AHC's defense 
of the second charge, we would reverse the ALJ's ruling. We 
find, however, no prejudice to AHC. 
AHC's absence from the first day of hearing on U-17986 will 
not negatively impact its defense of the second charge. AHC's 
argument to the contrary again proceeds from the mistaken premise 
that the consolidation made AHC a party to the first charge. As 
previously explained in our discussion, that is not an effect of 
the consolidation and there is no other prejudice to AHC. The 
ALJ eliminated any likelihood of prejudice to AHC by restricting 
the first day of hearing on U-17986 to the charging party's 
direct case. Most of the testimony taken at that hearing came 
from or involved D'Lando who is allegedly employed by HFA, not 
AHC. The rest of the testimony related to certain of HFA's 
defenses to that first charge, i.e., identity of bargaining 
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agent. No party has presented any evidence on the second charge, 
which concerns Hopson only. Moreover, AHC will be able to review 
the transcript of the first day of hearing before the next 
scheduled hearing dates and it will have a full opportunity to 
address by examination of his own witnesses, or the cross-
examination of witnesses on behalf of others, any issues of fact 
which it believes relate to it and were left unaddressed, unclear 
or incorrect after the first day of hearing. 
Finding that there are common fact and legal issues between 
the two charges, that consolidation may expedite processing of 
the charges, and that no prejudice to HFC or AHC is caused by the 
ordered consolidation, the ALJ's ruling consolidating the charges 
for hearing is affirmed. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: March 26, 1997 
Albany, New York 
d 0r**\ y ^ 
Paliline R. kinsella, Chairperson 
Eric 3/. Schmertz, Member/ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WESLEY M. CLEMENTS, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C - 4 6 3 9 
TOWN OF AVON (HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT), 
Employer, 
- and -
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, 
LOCAL 200-C, 
Intervenor. 
PHILLIPS, LYTLE, HITCHCOCK, BLAINE & HUBER (MARK L. SUHER of 
counsel), for Petitioner 
HARRIS BEACH & WILCOX (DAVID W. LIPPITT of counsel), for 
Employer 
DENNIS EAMES, for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On February 13, 1997, the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) issued a decision in the 
above matter finding that the petition filed by Wesley M. 
Clements (petitioner) to decertify the Service Employees 
International Union, Local 200-C as negotiating representative 
for certain of the employees of the Town of Avon (Highway 
Department) (employer) should be granted for lack of opposition. 
No exceptions have been filed to the Director's decision. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Service Employees 
International Union, Local 200-C be, and it hereby is, 
decertified as the negotiating representative of the following 
unit of employees of the employer: 
Included: MEO/Laborers employed in the Town Highway 
Department. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
DATED: March 26, 1997 
Albany, New York 
line R. Kinsella, Pau Chairperson 
Schmertz, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING 
ENGINEERS, LOCAL 106, 
Petitioner, 
-- and = '—- CASE NO. C^ -4618 
TOWN OF INDIAN LAKE, 
Employer. 
DANIEL J. MCGRAW, for Petitioner 
ROBERT A. LIPPMAN, ESQ., for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On December 6, 1996, the International Union of Operating 
Engineers, Local 106 (petitioner) filed, in accordance with the 
Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment Relations Board, a 
timely petition seeking certification as the exclusive 
representative of certain employees of the Town of Indian Lake 
(employer). 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in 
which they stipulated that the following negotiating unit was 
appropriate: 
Included: Road Supervisor, Heavy Equipment 
Operator (HEO), Medium Equipment 
Operator (MEO), Mechanic, 
Laborer, Pesticide Applicator, 
Janitor, Wastewater Assistant. 
Excluded: Highway Superintendent and other 
managerial employees not listed 
above. 
Case No. C-4618 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was 
held on February 28, 1997, at which a majority of ballots were 
cast against representation by the petitioner. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a 
majority of the eligible voters in the unit who cast ballots do 
not desire to be represented for the purpose of collective 
bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that the petition 
should be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: March 26, 1997 
Albany, New York 
iline R. Kinsella, Ch, Pauli hairperson 
Eric J./Schmertz, Member V 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CORINNE BANACH, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE- NO. 0^4622 
BELLMORE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
- and -
BELLMORE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL, 
Intervenor. 
BEVERLY R. HACKETT, ESQ., for Petitioner 
EHRLICH, FRAZER & FELDMAN (FLORENCE FRAZER of counsel), for 
Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On February 3, 1997, the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) issued a decision in the 
above matter finding that the petition filed by Corinne Banach to 
decertify the Bellmore Administrative Council as negotiating 
representative for a two-person unit of principals employed by 
the Bellmore Union Free School District (District) should be 
granted for lack of opposition.^ No exceptions have been filed 
to the Director's decision. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Bellmore Administrative 
k/
 30 PERB 1(4 004 (1997). The petition for decertification was 
never contested. 
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Council be, and it hereby is, decertified as the negotiating 
representative of the unit of principals employed by the 
District. 
DATED: - -Ma-reh-2 6->—19-9-7 --
Albany, New York 
l i n e , R. I t i n s e l l a , Paxilin , . I t i n s e l l a , Chairperson 
Er ic Jjr^lSchmertz, Membe 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO,. 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4571 
TOWN OF GRAND ISLAND, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit found to be appropriate 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the 
purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Clerk/Typist, Account Clerk/Mini-Computer 
Operator,^ Assessment Clerk, Assistant 
-
1
 The Town employs several Account Clerk/Mini-Computer 
Operators. Only Helen Newkirk was excluded from the unit by 
the Director because of her confidential duties. See 3 0 
PERB ij4033 (1997) . No exceptions have been filed to the 
Director's determination. 
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Engineer, Principal Engineer Assistant, Senior 
Engineer Assistant, Recreation Leader, 
Recreation Supervisor, Account Clerk/Typist, 
Chemist, Working Crew Chief, Cook, Plumbing 
Inspector, Supervising Accountant, Engineer, 
Building Inspector, Water Superintendent, 
Wastewater Superintendent, Recreation Director. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO.. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: March 26, 1997 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R.'Kinsella, Chairperson 
Eric J/^Schmertz, Membe^r 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION 
LOCAL 424, A DIVISION OF THE UNITED 
INDUSTRY WORKERS DISTRICT COUNCIL 424, 
Petitioner,~ - — 
-and- CASE NO. C-4612 
COLD SPRING HARBOR SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
LOCAL 144, DIVISION 100, SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, 
AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested, in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service 
Employees Union, Local 424, A Division of the United Industry 
Workers District Council 424 has been designated and selected by 
a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, 
Certification - C-4612 - 2 -
in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as 
their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All permanent full and part-time employees in 
the following categories: custodial, 
--- -maintenance and- grounds r -
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Public Service 
Employees Union Local 424, A Division of the United Industry 
Workers District Council 424. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: March 26, 1997 
Albany, New York 
PaulineR. Kinsella, Chairperson 
'^LA 
Erj/6'J. Schmertz, Member 
^ STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION 
LOCAL 424, A DIVISION OF UNITED INDUSTRY 
WORKERS DISTRICT COUNCIL 424, 
—- -• - - — Petitioner, -- -— --
-and- CASE NO. C-4613 
SOUTH HUNTINGTON UNION FREE 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
LOCAL 144, DIVISION 100, SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, 
AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, . 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service 
Employees Union Local 424, A Division of United Industry Workers 
District Council 424 has been designated and selected by a 
Certification - C-4613 
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majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit": Included!" ~ j^n caf e"teria"~employeesT 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Public Service 
Employees Union Local 424, A Division of United Industry Workers 
District Council 424. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: March 26, 1997 
Albany, New York 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4623 
GREENBURGH CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
NO. 7, 
Employer, 
-and-
GREENBURGH CIVIL SERVICE ORGANIZATION, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of. the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Greenburgh Civil Service 
Organization has been designated and selected by a majority of 
the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
Certification - C-4623 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All Civil Service personnel employed on a 
regular salary basis for the school calendar 
year, or for a 10, 11, or 12 month period, and 
regularly assigned to a half-time or greater 
weekly work schedule, as Woodlands High School 
monitors, bus drivers, switchboard operators, 
clerks, typists, .secretaries, .nurses,-school -
attendants, custodial workers or maintenance 
workers in the public schools of the District. 
Excluded: Supervisory personnel, secretaries to 
superintendent and to all assistant 
superintendents and/or business manager, part-
time employees paid at an hourly rate, 
personnel employed on a salary basis but 
working less than half of a full weekly 
schedule, and personnel hired on an annual 
basis under Federal or State grants. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Greenburgh Civil Service 
Organization. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment', or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: March 26, 1997 
Albany, New York 
v l ^ IC^f^c 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 456, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND : 
HELPERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
- and -
... . ... CASE—NO-.--e-4-6-35 
BRIARCLIFF MANOR UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 456, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of 
America, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority 
of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Cleaner, custodian, maintenance laborer, 
maintenance mechanic, groundsman, bus driver, 
head custodian. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Local 456, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of 
America, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes 
the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: March 26, 1997 
Albany, New York 
fc*Jr^ f. JCtN&f I <L. 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Eric CK Schmertz, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN & 
HELPERS, LOCAL 182, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4638 
TOWN OF BROOKFIELD, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters, Chauffeurs, 
Warehousemen & Helpers, Local 182, International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, AFL-CIO, has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: HEO, MEO, LEO, Laborers and Working Foremen of 
the Highway Department of the Town of 
Brookfield. 
Excluded: All others. 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Teamsters, Chauffeurs, 
Warehousemen & Helpers, Local 182, International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes 
the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: March 26, 1997 ^ 
Albany, New York 
% Xm4 
Pauline R . f c i n s e l l a / Chairperson 
Eric J^rSchmertz, Member 
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APPENDIX G 
OUTSIDE ACTIVITIES OF PER DIEM BOARD MEMBERS 
The Board has adopted the following resolution regarding the 
outside activities of its per diem members: 
Outside neutral activities of the two per diem members 
of PERB, including arbitration and other impartial 
labor relations activities, are permitted, subject, 
however, to the provisions of law, rules and canons of 
professional conduct regarding outside activities, 
conflicts of interest and appearances of impropriety 
requiring recusal. 
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SECTION I 
APPENDIX E 
NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
GUIDELINES FOR PER DIEM BOARD MEMBERS 
Section 205 of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Taylor Law) creates the Public Employment Relations Board and 
sets forth certain of the requirements for individual Board 
members. These guidelines will help you to fulfill your 
responsibilities on the Board and enhanceL_ypur_ awareness of „ 
certain matters that could interfere with your performance as a 
Board member. It is a Board member's responsibility, however, to 
become familiar with all statutory and regulatory provisions 
which govern a member's activities. 
Terms of office; Members of the Board are appointed by the 
Governor and confirmed by the Senate to a term of office of six 
years unless the appointee is named to succeed a person who has 
not completed the term. In that event, the appointee completes 
the time remaining in the term. 
Other employment: Section 205.2 of the Taylor Law explicitly 
states that members of the Board "shall hold no other public 
office or public employment in the state." 
As per diem members of the Board, you may engage in outside 
neutral activities such as arbitration and other impartial labor 
relations activities subject to the provisions of law, rules or 
canons of professional conduct regarding outside activities, 
conflicts of interest and appearances of impropriety. Disclosure 
of outside employment, relationships or activities may be 
appropriate in specific cases in which such employment, 
relationships or activities give rise to an actual or apparent 
-2-
conflict of interest, bias or impropriety requiring or warranting 
disqualification or recusal from a case. 
Per Diem Rate: Members of the Board are paid $250 per day, 
together with an allowance for actual and necessary expenses 
incurred on PERB business. 
The state workday is 7 1/2 hours per day; travel to Board 
meetings is considered part of the workday. Board members are 
expected to be prepared for meetings, i.e., decide cases, by 
reviewing drafts of decisions and other documents prior to their 
consideration by the full Board. The time spent in such 
preparation is considered official work of the agency and is 
compensated at the same rate as Board meetings. For your 
guidance, the experience at the Board is that members ordinarily 
require about one day of preparation for each scheduled day of 
meeting time. 
Official station: A Board member's official station is his/her 
home address. However, you are required to travel, as necessary, 
to attend all scheduled Board meetings. Of course, costs for 
such travel are reimbursed. 
Attendance at Professional Meetings. Conferences, etc.: It is 
the Board's policy to encourage members to participate in those 
professional meetings, conferences, seminars, etc. which advance 
the agency's interests, promote its goals, contribute to the 
knowledge in the field or which otherwise create a positive image 
for PERB. The agency, however, does not ordinarily underwrite 
expenses, nor does it pay the per diem, for Board members' 
attendance at conferences held by organizations where individual 
(personal) membership in that organization is required. For 
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example, a meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators, while 
important to arbitrators, is a conference where Board members 
would not be reimbursed by PERB for expenses, nor would they be 
paid the per diem. 
Administration; The Chairman of the Board, designated as such by 
the Governor for his/her full term of office, is the 
administrative head of the Board. As such, he/she is solely 
responsible for the day-to-day operations of the agency, and 
chairs all meetings of the Board. 
Board meetings: Board members are required to be present in 
order to participate in a case. No provision is available for 
any form of absentee or proxy voting. 
Parts of Board meetings are public; however, persons 
ordinarily do not ask to attend. 
Draft decisions prepared by the Deputy Chairman and Counsel 
are presented to the Board as far in advance of a meeting as 
possible. 
If requested by the Board, an oral presentation may be made 
by the Deputy Chairman at the meeting. 
Other staff do not ordinarily participate in Board meetings; 
however, the Board may require their attendance in relation to 
specific agenda items. For example, the Director of Conciliation 
would be expected to make a presentation when the Board considers 
appointments to its panels of mediators and fact finders. The 
Associate Counsel might make a presentation to the Board if a 
court case were under consideration for appeal. 
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